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CRIMINAL LAW—AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT OF
MASSACHUSETTS SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT DECISION-MAKING
ON CRIMINAL LAW FROM 1995 TO 2014

Thomas Gray *
A key component of America’s adversarial, case-based system
of law is that each case usually produces a winner, someone
who benefits from the application of a legal rule to the facts of
their controversy. Of all cases, winners and losers in criminal
law are most significant because losing often means a
considerable loss in personal freedom. This Article analyzes
the winners and losers of criminal appeals before the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court as a way of trying to
learn about how that court conducts its business and makes
decisions in one of its most crucial functions—being the final
arbiters of justice in state criminal law. The results indicate a
court that rules overwhelmingly against defendants on appeal,
but that has drifted by a small amount in a pro-defendant
direction over time. A key feature of the court’s decisions is
unanimity—it decides the vast majority of criminal appeals
without dissent. There is also no strong connection between the
party that appointed the justice and how they vote, implying
that partisanship does not play a strong role in how the court
decides criminal cases.

I NTRODUCTION
One of the consistent goals of legal process scholars is to
understand how judges come to their decisions.1 This process has
intellectual and historical value from providing insight to
understand and explain how decisions are reached: why do the
circumstances end with this result? Additionally, this process has
important contemporary civic value for understanding how our
governing and judicial systems work. We must understand how
* The author is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Politics at the
University of Virginia. The author would like to thank the Western New England
University Law Review staff for their diligent editorial assistance.
1. See Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin & Matthew M. Schneider, On the
Effective Communication of the Results of Empirical Studies, Part I, 59 VAND. L. REV.
1811, 1816–17 (2006).
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existing institutions and actors function to completely understand
important social factors, such as the “carceral state,”2 racial
disparities in criminal sentencing,3 and the independence and
separation of the branches of government. Further, understanding
the judicial decision-making process has practical value by
providing a basis to make informed predictions of future
jurisprudence.4 This is crucially important for lawyers who must
build their cases and arguments around their perception of what
position a judge is likely to take.
While reading individual cases is a meaningful way to gain
insight to a justice’s jurisprudence and thinking on a topic, there
are other ways to complement this approach. The quantitative
empirical analysis of court outputs is one such method. The benefit
of this approach is largely in its ability to aggregate beyond the
individual case to see the patterns in judicial behaviors—across
time and in various circumstances.5 A justice may be known for
writing a particular opinion limiting law enforcement’s investigative
powers, but may have otherwise spent years upholding lawenforcement actions in less salient or widely read cases.
Understanding a justice’s theoretical articulation and argument and
their actual, repeated behavior is a significant part of
understanding how judges exercise judicial authority. This Article
analyzes votes of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
(“SJC”) justices cast over a twenty-year period and investigates
what insights might be drawn from their actions when evaluated in
the aggregate.
I.

SEPARATING DECISIONS AND OUTCOMES

Each case typically produces two distinct outputs. First, the
primary focus of legal academic discourse is the legal rule. The
legal rule is comprised of interpretations, guidelines, definitions,
and explanations that collectively constitute, in the words of Chief
2. See, e.g., Vesla M. Weaver & Amy E. Lerman, Political Consequences of the
Carceral State, 104 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 817, 818 (2010) (defining the carceral state as
“the totality of this spatially concentrated, more punitive, surveillance and punishmentoriented system of governance”).
3. See, e.g., David B. Mustard, Racial, Ethnic, and Gender Disparities in
Sentencing: Evidence from the U.S. Federal Courts, 44 J.&L. & ECON. 285 (2001).
4. See, e.g., Jonathan P. Kastellec, The Statistical Analysis of Judicial Decisions
and Legal Rules with Classification Trees, 7 J. OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 204
(2010).
5. See Michael Heise, The Past, Present, and Future of Empirical Legal
Scholarship: Judicial Decision Making and the New Empiricism, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV.
819 (2002).
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Justice John Marshall, “what the law is.”6 Second, the application
of the legal rule to the facts of the case results in a decision for the
parties before the court. In short, someone wins while someone
else loses.7 Together these two outputs form the precedential
weight of a case: stipulating a rule for lower courts to apply, and
providing an example application.
This Article focuses exclusively on the winners and losers of
cases. While the legal rules themselves are of great importance, the
winners and losers are also very informative about judicial
decision-making. This Article specifically focuses on the winners
and losers in the most critical type of cases a judge decides—
criminal appeals. In these, whether a defendant wins often
determines whether, or for how long, the defendant will go to
prison. Additionally, when the legal rule application leads to the
defendant’s defeat, prosecutorial-leaning precedence is created to
be applied in subsequent criminal appeals.
Examining winners in the aggregate offers valuable insight as
well. States’ highest courts, such as the SJC, have a high-volume
caseload, producing a constant stream of legal rulings. The
complexity of these rules makes them difficult to analyze at a level
much larger than a small group. The complexity of many legal
rules makes their application easily distinguishable. As a result,
decisions that rely on the same legal rule may only be analyzed
with cases carrying near parallel factual circumstances. Thus, it is
difficult to see patterns in decision-making behavior over time.
Conversely, justices can be more easily analyzed and compared in
the aggregate by looking at case outcomes. For example, potential
comparisons include: separate justices to each other, individual
justices at differing points in their careers, and the appointees of
different governors.
II. THE DATA
The starting point to build the necessary dataset for this
Article is an existing dataset of all SJC opinions from 1995 to 2010.8
From this, all criminal appeals decided by that court are removed.
To cover a larger range of time, Hall and Windett’s work is
supplemented by adding criminal appeals from 2011 to 2014.9 The
6. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
7. Kastellec, supra note 4.
8. Matthew Hall & Jason Windett, New Data on State Supreme Court Cases, 13
ST. POL. & POL’Y Q. 427, 433 (2013).
9. To do this, all cases with a Lexis Headnote containing the word “criminal”
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result is a final dataset of all criminal law decisions by the SJC
spanning a twenty-year period, from 1995 to 2014. Aggregately, a
sufficient period for inquiry is created for meaningful analysis.
The Hall and Windett data do not provide information on the
crucial question for this Article’s analyses: who won the case.10
Instead, they provide the disposition: whether the lower court
ruling was overturned, affirmed, or otherwise disposed.11 By crossreferencing the lower court’s ruling12 with Hall and Windett’s
provided disposition, the winner of each case is thereby
determined. The logistical determination of “winners” is more
straightforward, albeit more tedious, than the substantive
determination of what it means to “win.” In the simplest cases, the
defendant wins when the SJC accepts the challenge raised in full,
reversing the lower court’s ruling.
Consider, for example,
Commonwealth v. Tavarez, in which the Commonwealth filed an
interlocutory appeal to overturn the Superior Court’s suppression
of surreptitiously recorded evidence.13 The court rejected the
Commonwealth’s claim and thus upheld the ruling leaving the
evidence suppressed.14 In this case, Tavarez, the defendant, is a
clear “winner.”
In contrast, the defendant clearly “loses” when the court
rejects all their challenges and the lower court’s disposition is
upheld in its entirety. For example, in Commonwealth v. Bishop,
Walter Bishop challenged his murder conviction on five different
claimed failures of the trial process.15 Five justices of the SJC
rejected each of Bishop’s claims.16 In this example, the court
clearly ruled against Bishop, and he is classified as “losing” the
appeal.
Everything in between these two clear categories is a gray
area. In a small number of cases, the court will accept one of the
defendant’s challenges, but reject others.
For these cases
determining a “winner” is difficult.
For example, in
Commonwealth v. Mello, Louis Mello appealed three convictions,
were added. This approach may not be exhaustive, but should be approximately
correct.
10. Hall & Windett, supra note 8.
11. Id. at 431.
12. This was determined from a variety of sources, including the recitation in the
case itself, and/or the case syllabus, and/or the case summary.
13. Commonwealth v. Tavarez, 945 N.E.2d 329, 330 (Mass. 2011).
14. Id.
15. Commonwealth v. Bishop, 963 N.E.2d 88, 90–91 (Mass. 2012).
16. Id. at 91.
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two for murder and one for arson.17 The court vacated the arson
conviction and affirmed both murder convictions.18 It is difficult to
devise a consistent system to classify cases of this type as each
party, by the definition used above, “wins.” Because these cases
represent less than ten percent of criminal cases in Massachusetts,
they are excluded from all subsequent analyses.19
Finally, individual justices’ votes are examined. All votes for
the majority’s disposition (including concurrences) are counted as
votes for a pro-defendant outcome when the defendant “wins.”
The sources for the justices’ votes come from the Hall and Windett
dataset20 and this author’s own research for 2011 to 2014. Those
justices who either wrote or joined a dissenting opinion constitute
dissenters. Thus, the dissenters in a disposition upholding the
defendant’s conviction are deemed pro-defendant votes by the
dissenting justices. Justices not participating in the vote are given
no value. These vote tallies are dichotomous and thus can easily be
aggregated and combined into a simple percentage.

17. Commonwealth v. Mello, 649 N.E.2d 1106, 1109–10 (Mass. 1995).
18. Id. at 1120.
19. Attempted methodologies to incorporate these cases include treating all cases
in which a defendant won at least one challenge resulting in a pro-defendant ruling.
These did not substantially alter any of the patterns and results presented in this
Article.
20. Hall & Windett, supra note 8.
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the wheels of justice moving efficiently. This is because higher
courts are more likely to hear criminal appeals with little merit to
ensure a defendant’s freedom is not erroneously compromised.
These facts together mean that many cases with little merit make it
to the high court where the convictions are confirmed, thereby
inflating the number of defendant losses.
Second, the rate of pro-defendant votes closely matches the
rate of pro-defendant decisions. There is a clear reason for this:
unanimity.23 This topic is discussed, infra Part VI, but it is
important to remain cognizant that the vast majority of SJC
decisions are unanimous. This means that votes and outcomes are
nearly perfectly aligned.
Finally, there is an upward trend in the data, with more prodefendant rulings in later years. However, this upward trend is
substantially driven by appeals from 2010 and 2012, while 2011 is a
below-average year. The peaks of 2010 and 2012 may be explained
by the random variation in the release date of decisions, with a
cluster of pro-defendant rulings released on the December side of
the 2010–11 divide and pro-Commonwealth rulings released on the
January side of the 2011–12 divide. Still, even if these peaks were
removed, the ten-year baseline from 2005 to 2014 is higher than the
ten-year baseline from 1995 to 2004. While the difference between
each ten-year period is only about four percentage points, it’s a
meaningful shift of fifteen to twenty percent given how low the
rates are on average.

23. See Peter J. Coughlan, In Defense of Unanimous Jury Verdicts: Mistrials,
Communication, and Strategic Voting, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 375 (2000).
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apply existing constitutional and statutory law. This is especially
true in criminal law, where the same factors that explained
defendants’ overall low rate of success before the SJC may also
explain some of the court’s unanimity. Many cases are likely not
strong appeals because convicted defendants have no cost in
making an appeal and little to lose if they have been sentenced to
prison. And defendants convicted of first-degree murder have a
right to appeal directly to the SJC.26
It is likely, however, that some cases do feature some
disagreement between the justices that does not appear in the final
decision.27 The justices’ heavy workload28 forces them towards
unanimity, and collegiality norms mean that justices only dissent in
rare cases (in these data, only seven percent of the time) when their
disagreement is sufficiently stark and important to merit the time
and effort necessary to craft a competing opinion.
V. NOT PLAYING WITH A FULL BENCH
While cases themselves are “unanimous,” this does not mean
that every justice on the court voted the same, but instead that all
justices who participated voted the same.
The number of
participating justices in a case ranges from four to seven. For
example, Commonwealth v. Carrierre,29 a case about the jointventure exception to the hearsay rule, was heard by just four
justices,30 while cases announced in the days immediately preceding
or following Carrierre were heard by five, six, or seven justices.31
26. ELSPETH B. CYPHER, CRIMINAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 63:17, 63:19
(Mass. Prac. 4th ed. 2015).
27. Consider, for example, when a court unanimously vacates or alters the ruling
of a single justice. In Bynum v. Commonwealth, the Court vacated the ruling of a
single justice of the SJC in a unanimous opinion. This implies that, at least initially, one
justice of the Court came to a different conclusion that is now lost in the unanimity of
the final decision. Bynum v. Commonwealth, 711 N.E.2d 138, 139 (Mass. 1999).
28. See About the Supreme Judicial Court, MASS.GOV, http://www.mass.gov/
courts/court-info/sjc/about/ [https://perma.cc/6LT2-6WTV] (last visited Feb. 15, 2016).
The Court typically decides about 200 cases a year, with an additional 600 cases heard
by single justices. Id.
29. 18 N.E.3d 326 (Mass. 2014).
30. Id. at 329–30 (Justices Spina, Corda, Duffly, and Lenk presiding).
31. Commonwealth v. Garcia, 18 N.E.3d 654, 657 (Mass. 2014) (heard by five
justices, with Justices Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, and Lenk presiding);
Commonwealth v. LaChance, 17 N.E.3d 1101, 1102 (Mass. 2014) (heard by six justices,
with Justices Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Gants, Duffly, and Lenk presiding);
Commonwealth v. Rollins, 18 N.E.3d 670, 673 (heard by seven justices, with Justices
Gants, Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, and Hines presiding). It is this variation
in bench composition that explains most of the variation in how cases are decided.
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hears, the gap between ninety-three percent and forty-one percent
is considerable.
Due to the unanimity between the SJC justices, these data are
not ideal for more sophisticated analyses of individual justice
preferences for pro-defendant outcomes, such as vote scaling35 or
Item Response Theory.36 These methods rely on differentiating
individual justices’ choices within each voting opportunity (in this
situation, justices’ votes within each individual case). They use
differing votes to identical questions to simultaneously estimate
ideological locations for both justices and the cases themselves
(such as, how hard it was, based on the particular nature of the
case, to vote in favor of the defendant). All of this requires
differences in votes to reveal information about the case itself.
Thus, unanimity makes cases uninformative using these methods.
Despite the problems that unanimity poses, it can still be
informative to investigate justices’ votes. For instance, when a
large percentage of cases reviewed are decided unanimously, those
fewer cases with split decisions invoke greater scrutiny—if only for
not being unanimous. In such cases, the arguments on each side
were sufficiently strong as to win at least one vote. The overall
average on these votes is about forty-eight percent in favor of
defendants, which fits the idea that non-unanimous cases represent
more ambiguous legal questions, where the odds of either party
winning are much closer to an even proposition. Non-unanimous
cases are more likely to reveal individual justices’ interpretations of
criminal law, compared to unanimous decisions. Since all justices
start with the same precedential and statutory base, but reach
different conclusions, these datum reflect differences between the
justices.

http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/SB_votesplit_OT14.pdf
[perma.cc/82D4-YDLV] (last visited Feb. 15, 2016) (referring to most cases in this
dataset as meritless).
35. See generally KEITH T. POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, IDEOLOGY AND
CONGRESS (2007); see also Boris Shor & Nolan McCarty, The Ideological Mapping of
American Legislatures, 105 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 530 (2011).
36. See generally Andrew Martin & Kevin Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point
Estimation via Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953–1999, 10
POL. ANALYSIS 134 (2002); Joshua Clinton, Simon Jackman, & Douglas Rivers, The
Statistical Analysis of Roll Call Data, 98 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 355 (2004); but see
Matthew Hall, Jeffrey Harden, & Jason Windett, Estimating Dynamic Ideal Points for
State Supreme Courts, 23 POL. ANALYSIS 461 (2015).
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variation in the unanimous cases largely comes from which justices
happen to participate in which cases.
VII.

PARTISAN JUSTICE: DO POLITICS EXPLAIN VARIATION
IN VOTES?

The most prominent theory of judicial decision-making in
judicial politics literature is the attitudinal model, most fully
articulated by Segal and Spaeth.40 The attitudinal model posits,
simply, that justices’ rulings are based largely on their preferred
policy goals.41 Each case represents an opportunity for a justice to
influence state policy on the topic in question.42
Within criminal law, this means that justices have their
opportunity to determine how punitive the state will be, how much
it will empower law enforcement, and how high a bar it will set for
prosecutors to attain a conviction.43 The attitudinal model posits
that justices’ positions will be determined exclusively by the
outcome the justice wants on these policy goals, ignoring existing
law and precedent.44 While admittedly simplistic, it has had strong
empirical power for explaining judicial decision making in many
judicial contexts.
In the context of the cases analyzed in this Article, the
attitudinal model’s predictions would be that justices vote in
criminal law cases to achieve the policy outcomes that they prefer.
Liberal justices would prefer more pro-defendant outcomes while
more conservative justices would prefer more pro-prosecution
outcomes.
To investigate whether the data analyzed in this Article
support this proposition at all, one would need some sense of what
individual justices think about criminal law; what are their policy
preferences? But this is a very difficult exercise. While their votes
are an interesting piece of evidence, it would be tautological to use
the votes to explain the votes. In addition, justices rarely publicly
reveal their own beliefs and positions.45 When they do, it is likely

40. See generally JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (The Press Syndicate of the
University of Cambridge 2002).
41. Id. at 86–88.
42. Id. at 1–3.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 86–88.
45. Consider the refusal of nominees to discuss their views about cases, which is
generally echoed by sitting justices for similar reasons. Robert Post & Reva Siegel,
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filtered through a lens of maintaining their public impartiality and
the court’s image as independent and objective.
Without a direct measure from the justices themselves, a proxy
measure of a justice’s likely leanings fits best. One approach
common in political science is to attribute to an appointee the
known positions of their appointer.46 This works under the logic
that when politicians appoint actors (such as justices), they do so
with the goal of picking a likeminded individual—liberal governors
pick justices that they believe will be liberal justices. For example,
Giles and Peppers use information about the President and homestate senators as a proxy measure for the liberalism or conservatism
of appointments to the federal bench.47 Bonica applied this to
judges, crediting judges with the ideology of their appointing
governor.48
Of course, appointers and appointees are rarely perfectly
aligned, as Republican presidents have repeatedly found after
placing a perceived “conservative” on the court.49 Still, Republican
and Democratic governors likely have different agendas in picking
high court justices, and one might expect that this has an effect on
some justices’ holdings in criminal cases. Figure 7 shows the vote
percentages made by appointees of each governor. Thus, the bar
labeled Patrick represents the percentage of pro-defendant votes
taken by appointees of Governor Deval Patrick.

Questioning Justice: Law and Politics in Judicial Confirmation Hearings, 115 YALE L.J.
POCKET PART 38, 38 (2006).
46. See generally Michael Giles, Virginia Hettinger & Todd Peppers, Picking
Federal Judges: A Note on Policy and Partisan Selection Agendas, 54 POL. RES. Q. 623
(2001).
47. Id.
48. Adam Bonica & Michael J. Woodruff, A Common-Space Measure of State
Supreme Court Ideology, J.L. ECON. & ORG. (Oct. 22, 2014). Note that Bonica’s
approach is to give individuals a rating based on their recorded campaign finance
behavior. Since conservatives are more likely to donate campaign funds to, and receive
campaign donations from, other conservatives, it is possible to create a score based on
the relationships between donors and recipients. Adam Bonica, Mapping the
Ideological Marketplace, 58 AM. J. OF POL. SCI. 367 (2014). In the second 2014 article,
Bonica applied this approach to state supreme court justices, but since appointed
justices often have little or no involvement in campaign finance, they lacked the
necessary data to form such a score. Bonica & Woodruff, supra note 48 at 10–11. For
many of these justices, Bonica & Woodruff applied the score of the governor that
appointed them. Id.
49. Consider, for example, Justice John Paul Stevens, a Nixon and Ford
appointee who ended his career as one of the Court’s liberal standard-bearers
according to the scores developed by Andrew Martin and Kevin Quinn. Martin &
Quinn, supra note 36.
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XI. LESSONS FROM THESE ANALYSES
These data reveal interesting attributes of the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court. First, defendants lose a large majority of
their appeals before the court. Despite this fact continuing through
to 2014, there has been some movement towards more prodefendant decisions in recent years. Two other facts about the
court’s criminal law activity quickly become apparent: the vast
majority of criminal cases are decided unanimously and most cases
feature less than the full complement of justices—creating some
randomness in the composition of the court for any one appeal.
Analyses of individual justices’ votes show that unanimity restricts
variation to a small band between twenty-five and thirty-five
percent in favor of defendants.
The more favorable and
unfavorable justices to defendants are not that different in their
total pro-defendant vote rates.
However, there is considerably more variation in the small set
of non-unanimous cases, which likely feature the most tightly
fought legal arguments.
In these cases, sufficiently strong
arguments were made on each side that they each won at least one
vote from one of the foremost jurists in the state. It is in these
cases where the prevailing law is less clear, where the “right”
outcome is not always apparent, and where reasonable and
informed minds may differ. Thus, these cases are also most likely
to feature the justices’ own predispositions, values, beliefs, and
favored policy outcomes. Despite this, there is little evidence of
systematic differences between Republican and Democratic
appointees. Democratic appointees to the court have been just
about as favorable to defendants as Republican appointees have,
despite the preferences of the parties diverging on criminal
punitiveness. There is some evidence that Governor Deval
Patrick’s appointees have been more willing to consider
defendants’ arguments than their predecessors, and that his
appointments effectively moved the median of the court in a prodefendant direction, but these differences are not dramatic.
Overall, these analyses imply a court whose selection process–
appointment by partisan governors–does not significantly politicize
the court’s criminal jurisprudence. And it also reveals a court that
balances a considerable workload by coming to substantial
agreement and unanimity, revealing their differences in only a
small number of meaningful cases.

